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The Routine of Muslim Solidarity

By 1985, the contest for primacy in Islam had settled into a fixed pattern. Khomeyni's revolution had turned Iran into Saudi Arabia's principal rival for the speakership of authentic Islam. Egypt and Libya played supporting roles, representing lesser varieties of conservative and radical Islam. These rivalries had reached an apex in the immediate aftermath of Iran's revolution, when further revolution momentarily appeared irresistible. But in 1984-85, the struggle between competing visions of Islam settled into a set routine. The periodic conferences of Muslim states repeated familiar resolutions. Muslim leaders reiterated the themes of past speeches in praise and denunciation of one another. State-supported subversion, undertaken in the name of Muslim unity, made no noticeable gains. The impasse complemented the stalemate on the war front between Iran and Iraq. A very partial verbal truce between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Egypt's very partial restoration to Islamic respectability, survived the year. But the challenges mounted to both confirmed that the Muslim world's self-inflicted wounds had not yet healed.

There did exist in the Muslim world a widespread desire for internal reconciliation and unity. That desire often cut across the conventional boundaries of language and sect. It rested upon a shared Muslim aspiration for cultural anthenticity and for liberation from outside manipulation and control. But that desire had become a bone of contention among states, fearful lest other states use the popular sentiment of solidarity to undermine their legitimacy. The practical attempts to translate sentiment into action were therefore dominated by states, in alliance either with other states or with movements of protest and opposition in other states.

MUSLIM DIPLOMACY AND ITS CRITICS

The Jidda-based Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) continued to languish in the shadow in the Iraqi-Iranian war, a struggle between two member states that seriously split the organization's membership. The league of forty-five states went through the usual motions of convening conferences and spawning resolutions. But the Muslim world seemed no more united in purpose, and the ICO's deliberations often served only to heighten those rivalries which did divide the Muslim world. These included, above all, the Gulf war and profound disagreements over the legitimacy of Israel and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. (For the ICO's growing difficulties, see *Middle East Contemporary Survey [MECS]*, 1981-82, pp 283-84, 298-301; 1982-83, pp 235-37; 1983-84, pp 158-65.)[1]

Opposing Muslim views came to a head once again during the ICO's annual conference of Foreign Ministers, held in San'a from 18-22 December 1984. The divisions even extended to hotel accommodations. The delegations of Iran, Syria, Libya, and South Yemen were housed at one hotel; the delegations of Iraq, Egypt, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), at another.[2] The first confrontation occurred over the presence of Egypt's delegation. Egypt had been suspended from the ICO in 1979 for having signed the Camp David Accords but had been invited to

resume its membership by a decision of the ICO summit in Casablanca in January 1984. Iran's boycott of that summit had paved the way for the move (see *MECS* 1983-84, pp 160-62). Now an Iranian delegation arrived in San'a and sought to reopen the issue of Egypt's standing. Egypt, claimed Iran, continued to flout ICO resolutions by maintaining relations with Israel. "How can the conference simply ignore its own resolutions?" asked Iran's Foreign Minister, 'Ali Akbar Velayati. "What credibility will such open violations of the most important ratifications and decisions of the conference give to the ICO?"[3] Syria and Libya joined in the attack, and the dispute during the preparatory sessions caused a delay in the opening of the conference.[4] Yet nothing had changed since Casablanca, where Egypt's supporters had been in the majority, and they now claimed that a conference of Foreign Ministers could not reopen an issue already settled by a conference of Heads of State. Iran, Libya, and Syria relented, but not on the principle: they expressed their reservations about Egypt's presence and gave notice that they would challenge Egypt's readmission at the next ICO summit conference.[5]

From the moment the conference opened, the delegations were plunged into the controversy between Iran and Iraq. Since Iran steadfastly opposed any negotiated settlement with the existing Iraqi regime, it had always been cool toward ICO mediation of the war. Surprise therefore greeted ICO Secretary-General Habib Chatti's hint that Iran had welcomed a renewed ICO initiative for mediation in the war.[6] But Chatti was either misled or misleading, for Velayati immediately denied that Iran had altered its attitude. The Iranian Foreign Minister also conveyed his Government's formal reservations over the conference resolution on the war, which called on both sides to end hostilities immediately and cooperate with the ICO's "good offices" committee.[7] That committee later met in Jidda in May and September 1985, under the chairmanship of Gambian President Dawda Jawara. Neither meeting produced any constructive result.[8] Iran had "shut the door" on the committee,[9] and even Iraq became suspicious of the committee's plans for an ICO-monitored cease-fire.[10] Iraq, said a Foreign Ministry spokesman, "[did] not believe that the committee or the ICO bodies possess[ed] the necessary expertise and technical knowhow" for peacekeeping.[11]

PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat also arrived in San'a for the conference. The attention usually lavished by the ICO on the PLO and the Palestinian cause had been diminished by the delegates' preoccupation with the Iraqi-Iranian war. 'Arafat's purpose was to remind the ICO of a past resolution of *jihad* against Israel and an operative resolution for the creation of an ICO military bureau, to coordinate PLO military cooperation with Muslim states. The military bureau appeared on the ICO's organizational chart but did not really exist. (On the evolution of the military bureau idea, see *MECS* 1980-81, pp 125, 129; 1981-82, p 300; 1982-83, p 236; 1983-84, p 164.) 'Arafat now asked that a conference of military officers, representing all ICO member states, be convened in Jidda within six months.[12] But an ICO Assistant Secretary-General quickly denied that the conference would discuss any unified Muslim military plan.[13] Instead, conference resolutions urged that the ICO's inactive Israel boycott office, established by an ICO summit conference in 1981, actually begin to function.[14] In April 1985, the boycott office finally did convene a first conference in Jidda.[15]

The remainder of the conference's inflated agenda of 106 items proved difficult to digest, and the proceedings threatened to become a rush of meaningless resolutions.

Kuwait's Foreign Minister referred to "repeated complaints" of committee chairmen that the conference's work "was all but impossible to accomplish in a few days". In future, he pleaded, the agenda would have to be condensed.[16] Iran's Velayati went still further, and his criticism, although politically colored, touched on the ICO's creeping political paralysis. On Palestine, he said, "empty statements [were] repeated tiresomely every year in [the] gathering". Since the ICO "ha[d] not been able to solve any problem in the course of a decade and a half, it [would be] appropriate to seriously revise its course, organization, and administrative method". To continue past policies would only "waste the time and capital" of member states. The ICO's organization had to be "workable" and its management, "independent-minded".[17] A broad dissatisfaction prompted the conference to order the creation of a "committee of experts" to evaluate the efficacy of the ICO, the ICO's Secretariat, and subsidiary institutions.[18] The step came at a moment of transition, inasmuch as the term of office of Habib Chatti as Secretary-General ended with the San'a conference. He was succeeded by Sharifuddin Pirzada, a sixty-two-year-old former Attorney General of Pakistan.[19] Pirzada spent most of 1985 traveling in member states and issuing statements.

Just as the ICO's agenda had grown to formidable proportions, so too had the ICO's subsidiary bodies. Some of these now encountered financial difficulties. The Islamic Solidarity Fund (ISF) was reportedly very low on funds.[20] The International Islamic News Agency (IINA) had accumulated a large deficit, and the salaries of its employees were in arrears.[21] The unchecked expansion of such agencies had occurred during years of plenty, and they were the first to feel the pinch of the new austerity. Such progress as the ICO did register during the year occurred in its healthier subsidiary organizations, devoted to cultural, economic, and technological cooperation. In addition to supervising the work of the well established Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the ICO also considered a $700m plan submitted by its own Islamic Institute for Science, Technology, and Development, which called for construction of twenty special ICO scientific centers. The Institute also planned to establish a Muslim academy of science and an extensive computerized data base.[22] But it was not clear how the funds for such an ambitious program would be raised. In this, as in every other respect, the ICO simultaneously reflected the highest aspirations of Muslims and the very real limitations of a divided Muslim world.

ISLAM OF COMPROMISE

In the running debate over the political meaning of Islam, a number of Muslim rulers and regimes advocated a compromise with the wider world. They saw no contradiction between the principles of Islam and alliances with Great Powers, secularizing modernization, and even peace with Israel. Those who upheld such interpretations were forced into a defensive position by Iran's revolution, leading them to intensify their efforts at Islamic self-justification. A few states pursued these efforts beyond their own borders, in a broad campaign to stem the influence of Islamic revolution, not only at home but throughout the Muslim world. At the forefront of this effort stood Saudi Arabia, and its activities were augmented by the parallel campaigns conducted by Egypt and Iraq. Together they sought to formulate an interpretation of Islam more pragmatic than any other, an interpretation shunning confrontation for compromise.

THE ADVANCE OF SAUDI ISLAM

The Saudi vision of Islam continued to be spread by well endowed institutions based in Saudi Arabia but operating throughout the Muslim world. The Mecca-based Muslim World League (MWL; *Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami*) bore the brunt of this campaign. (On the MWL, see *MECS* 1981-82, pp 295-97; 1982-83, pp 246-47; 1983-84, pp 165-66.) The MWL's scale of operations had reached daunting proportions. Saudi Arabia provided the MWL with SR100m annually, and an additional SR25m went to the MWL's subsidiary, the Mecca-based Supreme World Council of Mosques. In turn, the MWL financed the activities of 700-1,000 Muslim missionaries throughout the world. It maintained thirty offices abroad and ran an institute for missionary preparation which produced sixty graduates a year.[23] The MWL channeled extensive support to mosque-building projects and supervised a relief agency for Muslim refugees and victims of famine.[24] These efforts aimed at securing the recognition by Muslims everywhere of the supreme religious authority of Saudi Arabia and its ruling house.

Above all, the MWL organized conferences, large and small, on a remarkably wide variety of topics. These gatherings were avidly attended by the ubiquitous Secretary-General of the MWL, Dr 'Abdallah 'Umar al-Nasif. Notable among Nasif's travels in late 1984 were two trips to Rome. In September 1984, Nasif had an audience with Pope John Paul II and discussed the possibility of a jointly sponsored dialogue encounter with the Vatican's Secretariat for Non-Christians. This was the first such reception accorded to an MWL Secretary-General and the first evidence of the MWL's interest in participating in a formal dialogue.[25] Nasif returned to Rome in December 1984 to attend the cornerstone ceremony for Rome's first mosque. This project had long stirred controversy, because many of the city's residents felt it inappropriate that the muezzin's call be sounded in Christianity's capital city. The mosque, planned on a grand scale, was expected to cost $37.5m. Saudi Arabia provided $6m, the largest single contribution from any of the twenty-nine Muslim states committed to the project.[26] Nasif's incessant globe-trotting took him from Manila to Kampala, from Madrid to New York. One of the year's highlights was a conference on the future of Islamic missionary work in South America, convened by Nasif in Brasilia from 27-29 September 1985. As is customary on such occasions, the MWL disbursed sums of money to many mosques and Islamic centers.[27]

Through these efforts, the MWL sought to contain any spread of enthusiasm in the wider Muslim world for Iran's revolution. This made the MWL the frequent target of published attacks in the Iranian and Iranian-inspired Muslim Press. These portrayed the MWL as the subservient instrument of the House of Sa'ud, whose minions grossly exaggerated the extent of the regime's financial support for Islamic causes.[28] The MWL did not respond to such charges, which reached a crescendo in August 1985 after the MWL issued a statement condemning all political demonstrations during the pilgrimage.[29] Iran's Ministry of Islamic Guidance called the statement "a link in a chain of plots by the world aggressors and their lackeys",[30] and the daily newspaper of Iran's ruling party postulated "a connection between this strange statement and the schemes of the US to repress the Islamic resurgence in the Islamic world".[31] (For the wider pilgrimage controversy in 1985, see below.)

In addition to having these avenues for spreading influence, Saudi Arabia also extensively supported Afghan opposition groups based in Pakistan. Aid included

money, weapons, and advisers who were generally provided by Saudi-backed branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in various countries. The Saudi embassy in Islamabad served as the principal conduit for this aid. The rivalries among the various Afghan exile groups somewhat diminished the effectiveness of Saudi help. But the Soviet-backed Afghan regime charged that such support was all that kept the "counterrevolutionaries" in action.[32] Saudi support for these groups was given symbolic emphasis in December 1984, when the annual Faysal International Prize for Service to Islam was awarded to 'Abd Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf, head of the Islamic Union of Afghan Strugglers *(Ittehade Islamiyye Mojahedine Afghanistan).* His prize carried an award of SR350,000. Sayyaf, a graduate of Kabul University, had done advanced studies at al-Azhar in Cairo, where he probably joined the Muslim Brotherhood; of the many resistance groups, his enjoyed the closest ties to Saudi Arabia.[33] The Saudis worked assiduously to unify the other ranks of the Afghan resistance, and this culminated in the creation of an alliance composed of seven resistance groups, at Peshawar in May 1985. Saudi Arabia hoped to eventually have representatives of this alliance seated as members in the ICO, in place of the suspended Afghan regime.[34] Saudi Arabia's support was limited to predominantly Sunni groups; Iran pursued its own organizing efforts among Afghanistan's Shi'i minority (see below).

In the field of international Islamic banking, the Geneva-based Dar al-Maal al-Islami (DMI), the brainchild of Saudi Prince Muhammad al-Faysal Al Sa'ud, continued to expand. The DMI had suffered a crisis of confidence following losses in 1983, resulting in the replacement of the top management team (see *MECS* 1983-84, pp 166-67). The DMI now claimed to have put the episode "firmly behind" them and launched a campaign to raise capitalization to $478m. The DMI also grew from one to over twenty deposit-taking branches in less than two years, in places as widely scattered as the Bahamas and Bahrain, Guinea and Egypt.[35] The international operations of DMI and other Saudi-initiated Islamic banks indirectly enhanced Saudi political influence in other countries and, in some instances, provided influential positions in finance to Muslim Brotherhood activists.

EGYPT BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE WEST

Egypt, once restored to the ICO, anxiously pursued a quest for wider Islamic respectability. Egyptian delegations participated in every Islamic gathering to which they were invited, and they were present at meetings of every ICO-affiliated organization. At the same time, official and semi-official Egyptian delegations were welcomed in the many Muslim gatherings sponsored or inspired by Saudi Arabia. Many of these delegations were led by the Shaykh al-Azhar, Jad al-Haqq 'Ali Jad al-Haqq, whose contribution to these forums was his religiously-colored criticism of Israeli policies. The Shaykh al-Azhar maintained ties with the head of the Supreme Muslim Council in Jerusalem, Shaykh Sa'd al-Din al-'Alami, and dwelt frequently on Israel's "provocations" against the Aqsa mosque.[36] A special "Jerusalem and *Jihad* Committee" of al-Azhar's Academy of Islamic Researches closely monitored the situation in the city.[37] During the year, the Shaykh al-Azhar appealed to Khomeyni to end the Iraqi-Iranian war[38] and especially championed the cause of Bulgaria's Muslims, who were increasingly subjected to measures meant to distance them from Islam.[39] Egypt's Minister of Religious Endowments, al-Ahmadi Abu al-Nur,

conducted a parallel pursuit of influence. Because of limited means, Egypt maintained only about forty missionaries abroad, but some 500 Egyptian *imams* were on contract loan abroad.[40]

MUSLIMS FOR IRAQ

From the outset of the Iraqi-Iranian war, the besieged regime of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn had been the target of an Iranian propaganda campaign formulated in the language of Islam. Iraq responded in part by calling into question the Islamic credentials of Iran, and, with this purpose in mind, Iraq resorted to the sponsorship of a Popular Islamic Conference *(al-Mu'tamar al-Islami al-Sha'bi)* in April 1983 (see *MECS* 1982-83, pp 243-45). This forum was convened for a second time in Baghdad from 22-25 April 1985. Over 300 persons participated in the conference, including the Assistant Secretary-General of the Saudi-backed MWL and an official delegation led by Egypt's Minister of Religious Endowments.[41] The conference essentially constituted a rally of Muslim clerics and lay activists from those countries aligned with Iraq against Iran. Saddam Husayn also attended and addressed the gathering.[42]

The conference passed resolutions unequivocally condemning "the oppressive and cruel rulers of Iran" and called on all Muslim states to sever diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural ties with that country. The conference declared 25 April — the concluding day of the conference — as annual "Iraq Day", to serve as a "reminder of the cooperation of the world of Islam with Iraq".[43] It also established a seventeen-man international committee to supervise implementation of the resolutions. Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi, royal adviser to Saudi King Fahd, chaired the new committee charged with meeting every three months to review the war situation.[44] The Popular Islamic Conference thus would demonstrate, for those in need of an occasional reminder, that there were committed Muslims who supported Iraq in the war. In doing so, it excited Iranian indignation as no other line of propaganda could. In a characteristic reaction, the spiritual leader of the Iraqi exile movement in Tehran, Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, called the conference "a plot hatched by the eastern and western superpowers".[45]

IRAN'S ISLAM OF CONFRONTATION

The Islamic Republic of Iran remained committed to a policy of exporting Islamic revolution. (For the development of this policy, see *MECS* 1981-82, pp 288-92; 1982-83, pp 238-53; 1983-84, pp 167-70.)[46] According to 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Speaker of the *Majlis*, Iran had "no intention of hiding the export of Islamic revolution. The Islamic revolution does not confine its true and noble nature to geographical borders and deems the conveying of the message of revolution, which is the selfsame message of Islam, as its own duty". But he stressed that "the method of force and imposition" in pursuit of this policy was "not to [Iran's] liking".[47] In fact, Iran's methods continued to range from persuasion to intervention, according to local circumstances. Much of this effort continued to be directed toward Shi'is outside Iran, but Tehran showed a deepening interest in Sunni fundamentalist movements.

ISLAMIC MEDIUM AND MESSAGE

Following the revolution, a growing number of institutions took up the task of openly spreading Iran's message to other Muslims. These efforts were conducted under the

patronage of Ayatollah Husayn 'Ali Montazeri, who was designated Imam Khomeyni's heir apparent in November 1985. The designation stirred controversy in some clerical circles, since Montazeri did not enjoy a high reputation as a religious scholar. Montazeri therefore needed a major achievement in the political realm which would compensate for his scholarly deficiencies. Khomeyni had brought Islamic revolution to Iran, and no one could inherit the aura conferred by that achievement. Montazeri instead sought to make his name synonymous with the spread of Islamic revolution beyond Iran's borders. A clear success in this effort would establish him as a worthy leader in his own right and would take the wind out of critics, who claimed that his devotion to Khomeyni constituted his sole qualification to lead.

Montazeri presided over a wild proliferation of organizations devoted to disseminating Iran's message of revolution. In 1985 he called for a streamlining of the propaganda effort, which seemed at times to lack any central coordination. Montazeri now argued that quality, not quantity, would bring success. For example, there were too many publications devoted to the task; their sponsoring organizations should pool their financial and manpower resources, to publish fewer but better bulletins and magazines. Also, the pan-Islamic conferences sponsored by Iran in the past had been packed with large but undistinguished audiences from abroad. The message would be much better served by bringing to Iran a few of the most knowledgeable and learned scholars.[48]

Since 1983, Tehran had hosted two such conferences each year: the World Congress of Friday *Imams* and Prayer Leaders, and the Conference on Islamic Thought. Perhaps because of the unnecessary duplication represented by these two annual gatherings, the central secretariat of the World Congress did not convene an international conference in 1985, instead merely recommending the political points which Iran hoped would be made in Friday prayer sermons throughout the world. In October 1985, Montazeri nonetheless urged the central secretariat to take preliminary steps toward convening the overdue congress.[49] The Conference on Islamic Thought did meet, for the third time, from 29-31 January 1985. Participants condemned Israel, Iraq, and the "corruption and moral deviations which are exported from the East and the West".[50] A number of Muslim conferences, which appeared to be Iranian-inspired, were also convened in Europe.[51] For some of Iran's Muslim sympathizers, this was apparently more convenient than a trip to Tehran, which might have raised suspicion in their own countries. Iranian-inspired conferences on the political meaning of pilgrimage also met in places as diverse as Beirut and Bangkok.[52]

News of these public activities was accompanied by reports of worldwide Iranian organization of clandestine Muslim opposition groups. The accuracy of such reports was necessarily open to question, given the intensive campaign of disinformation waged by Iraq against Iran. The most persistent account claimed that Iran coordinated a systematic campaign of propaganda and subversion through a Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Council, liberally funded by Montazeri's office.[53] (For the gist of earlier reports, see *MECS* 1983-84, pp 173-74.) But no published report offered a precise picture of the council's operations, its personnel, or its relationship to the various contending centers of power in Iran. A formal council was certainly not an essential component of a clandestine campaign, but it may have served to impress upon Iran's Muslim supporters from abroad the need for submission to a clearly defined structure of authority.

By asserting his authority, Montazeri aimed to enforce Iran's own priorities in the export of Islamic revolution. Since Iran's revolution, Tehran had become the seat of numerous *émigré* Shi'i organizations devoted to establishing Islamic republics in Iraq, the Arab Gulf States, and Afghanistan. Iran also maintained close ties with Shi'i supporters in Lebanon, under the cover of Iran's diplomatic and consular missions and through many visits by Iranians to Lebanon, and by Lebanese to Iran. And Iran perhaps began to forge ties to various Sunni fundamentalist movements in the ME and North Africa, via Shi'i intermediaries in London and Rome. Each foreign Muslim client pressed to have its own cause raised to the very top of Iran's agenda. Iran, in turn, sought to keep all of these groups in tow but had a clear sense of priorities, set by the exigencies of the war with Iraq. More particularly, Iran's plan to isolate Iraq placed certain limits upon Iranian support for these movements. The limits were determined by Iran's desire to deprive Iraq of Soviet support, its plan to drive a wedge between Iraq and the other Arab Gulf States, and its hope to unnerve Iraq through its own alliance with Syria. Extensive Iranian support for certain kinds of subversion risked driving the Arab Gulf States into Iraq's arms, compelling the Soviets to back Iraq to the hilt, and disillusioning Syria as to the benefits of an Iranian alliance. For these reasons, Iran dispensed support for Islamic revolution in carefully measured portions.

IRAN AND ISLAM IN THE GULF

Following the failure of an Iranian-inspired coup attempt in Bahrain, in December 1981, Iran had adopted an attitude of caution toward the Arab Gulf. The Shi'is living throughout the Gulf constituted a potential reservoir of support for Iran, and Iran continued to seek influence among them. But the regimes across the Gulf, for all their weaknesses, would not fall, and the foiled coup had driven them still further into Iraq's embrace. Iran apparently resolved not to repeat this mistake. The Islamic Republic did not abandon the cause of Islamic revolution in the Arab Gulf, but encouragement of the kind given to the Bahraini coup attempt was suspended. By Iran's calculation, an interventionist policy in the Gulf would more sensibly follow a decisive blow to Iraq.

This policy of restraint created obvious problems for the various Shi'i *émigré* movements based in Tehran. Frustration was particularly evident among the Iraqi Shi'i groups operating under Iranian auspices. (For details on these groups, see *MECS* 1983-84, pp 170-71.) They had enjoyed no success in stirring up an Iraqi Shi'i uprising against the regime of Saddam Husayn, and they had grown impatient with Iran's slow progress in the war. They were also subjected to demoralizing blows. In March 1985, news came that ten more members of the Hakim family had been executed, in yet another Iraqi move to punish the head of the Tehran-based Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim.[54]

Some in the Iraqi Shi'i opposition sought a solution by intimidating or destabilizing Kuwait, where they operated with a considerable amount of latitude. This campaign had begun on 12 December 1983, with a spate of Shi'i bombings there. These were followed by the arrest and trial of the implicated Shi'is, six of whom were sentenced to death in March 1984. However, the sentences were not carried out immediately, prompting a series of Shi'i kidnappings and hijackings intended to force Kuwait to

release the condemned prisoners. The Shi'i campaign against Kuwait continued with the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner to Tehran in December 1984. It culminated in the attempted assassination, by suicidal car bomb, of the Emir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, on 25 May 1985. (The Emir sustained only minor injuries.) The perpetrators of these attacks were Iraqi Shi'is, who enjoyed the cooperation of some Lebanese Shi'is as well. Most of the evidence concerning reponsibility for these acts pointed towards the Tehran-based Iraqi Shi'i opposition group *al-Da'wa*, or a faction of *al-Da'wa*. (For additional details, see chapter on the Gulf States.)

These Iraqi Shi'i groups and factions enjoyed the support and haven offered by Tehran, and the patronage of highly placed Iranian officials. But the precise extent of Iranian involvement in initiating these actions, particularly the Kuwaiti airliner hijacking and the unsuccessful assassination attempt, was not clear. The hijacking of the airliner to Tehran apparently took place without Iranian foreknowledge. However, Iran's clerical rulers had a broad sympathy with the aims of the hijackers, particularly their demand for the release of the condemned Shi'is in Kuwait.[55] In amplifying these demands, Iran took on the appearance of an accomplice to the hijacking, in which two American passengers were deliberately killed. When it became clear that Kuwait would not release the condemned Shi'is, Iran ordered an end to the affair and seized the airliner. The episode left the impression that Iran, through a certain overindulgence of the Iraqi Shi'i movements, was not averse to harassing Kuwait through Iraqi Shi'i proxies, provided Iran did not appear to be implicated. But when such intimidation seemed to implicate Iran directly, it was quick to disclaim all responsibility for the deeds of Iraqi Shi'i zealots. Another disclaimer followed the failed assassination attempt against the Emir of Kuwait, carried out by an alleged member of *al-Da'wa*.[56] This went a good deal beyond the measured intimidation which Iran had practiced in the past, and it went to some lengths to distance itself from the attack, calling it "incompatible" with Iran's policies and charging that it was an act of Iraqi provocation.[57] Kuwait nevertheless accelerated a policy of expelling several thousand Iranian nationals, some of whom had been residents in Kuwait for decades.[58] In the case of Kuwait, innocent Iranians now began to pay a price for a campaign of intimidation for which none openly claimed credit.

The other Shi'i *émigré* groups concerned with the Gulf confined their activities to propaganda. The Tehran-based Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, under Sayyid Hadi al-Mudarrasi, undertook a campaign to mobilize support among Shi'is in Great Britain, through the Ahl al-Bayt Association, an organization inspired by the Iranian embassy in London. In June 1985, eight alleged members of the Front — six Bahrainis, a Kuwaiti, and a Saudi — were deemed by the British Home Office a danger to public order and were deported to Syria.[59]

Perhaps none of the Shi'i *émigré* movements faced a dilemma as acute as that which confronted the Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula. Devoted to the overthrow of the Saudi regime, this Shi'i group watched with consternation as Tehran hosted a visit by Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal in May 1985. Iran had initiated the visit within the framework of a policy of partial *rapprochement* with Iraq's Arab backers. A return visit to Saudi Arabia by Iran's Foreign Minister, Velayati, took place in December 1985. (See below and chapters on Saudi Arabia and Iran.) The Saudi opposition group provided a cold analysis of the motives of both countries in conducting these talks. One Saudi purpose, it opined,

was to eliminate Iranian-backed opposition to Saudi rule. But it went on to point out that "the Islamic opposition to the Saudi regime was not created at Iran's command and [did] not continue only by virtue of Iranian support. Consequently, it [was] not susceptible to Iranian pressures. The Islamic opposition arose before the victory of the revolution in Iran. It [was] independent, [had] its own independent objectives and plans, and [drew] its strength and support from the people within Saudi Arabia".[60] Here was a rare sign of dissatisfaction among Shi'i revolutionaries with the regional policy pursued by Iran.

IRAN IN LEBANON

In Lebanon, Iran took a much firmer stand in favor of the replacement of an existing regime by an Islamic Republic. Lebanon's large Shi'i population, its communal tensions and governmental disarray, and its shared border with Israel all worked to Iran's advantage. The large Shi'i population provided a reservoir of potential support. Communal tensions heightened the appeal of all ideologies framed in explicitly religious terms. The Central Government's paralysis meant that Iran's Shi'i supporters could operate freely within Lebanon itself, and Iran could even station a 1,500-man Revolutionary Guard contingent in the country without the consent of the Lebanese Goverment. The Israeli presence in South Lebanon provided the opportunities for struggle and martyrdom which constituted the essence of Imam Khomeyni's message. (For the extent of Iranian involvement in Lebanon, see *MECS* 1983-84, pp 171-73.)

Iran gained much influence in late 1984 and the first half of 1985 by encouraging Shi'i resistance to Israel in the south. Iranian involvement took the form of indoctrination, logistical support, and training. For the most part, the indoctrination was indirect, done by Lebanese Shi'i *'ulama* in the mosques of Beirut. Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah enjoyed a certain preeminence among these preachers, because of his inspirational style and his seniority. Fadlallah had close ties to the Iraqi Shi'i *al-Da'wa* (he was himself born in Iraq of a Lebanese father), and he had adroitly ridden the crest of the pro-Iranian wave which swept the poor Shi'i quarters of Beirut after Iran's revolution. Iran relied heavily upon his articulate preaching to disseminate its message in a lucid Arabic to Beirut's Shi'is. But Fadlallah was an imperfect medium. He consistently took independent stands without consulting Iran and had a rather low opinion of Iran's "experts" on Lebanon, whom he regarded as ignorant of the nuances and euphemisms of the Lebanese political game.[61] He personally aspired to speak not only for the pro-Iranian faction of Lebanon's Shi'i community but for the entire Shi'i community and even for all of Lebanon's Muslims.[62]

For this reason, Iran frequently employed the services of younger and more pliable *'ulama* in Beirut. These were given responsibilities as leaders of various Iranian-backed front organizations. Most belonged to the Coalition of Islamic *'Ulama (Tajammu' al-'Ulama al-Muslimin)*, an organization created to unite Shi'i and Sunni clerics but which was overwhelmingly Shi'i in composition. Its nominal leaders were Shaykh Mahir Hamud, a Sunni, and the Najaf-schooled Shaykh Zuhayr Kanj.[63] *Hizballah* — the "Party of God" — constituted the framework for uniting the clerical elite with the lay rank-and-file. Initially, Iran's supporters and clients denied the existence of a structured *Hizballah*, claiming that *Hizballah* did not represent a party-militia backed by Iran, but a sublime slogan of identification with Islam. According to Iran's Chargé d'Affaires in Beirut, Mahmud Nurani, Iran did "not consider... *Hizballah*... restricted

to a specified organizational framework... there [were] two parties, *Hizballah* or God's party, and the Devil's party".[64] But during 1984, the name *Hizballah* was appropriated by some Shi'is who did not closely follow Iran's instructions. This led Iran to bring the organizational existence of *Hizballah* out into the open, at a Beirut rally in February 1985.[65] On that occasion, *Hizballah* published a platform and named the Qom-educated Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin official spokesman in Beirut.[66] Henceforth, only Ibrahim al-Amin represented the approved line of *Hizballah*, and he commenced granting extensive inteviews to the Press in his new capacity. He said, "[Iranians] are very ambitious for others to win the same way they won. Therefore they support us, because we seek freedom. As Imam Khomeyni says, our politics is our religion and our religion is our politics".[67] Iran's Chargé d'Affaires in Beirut, Mahmud Nurani, provided continuous liaison with *Hizballah* in the city. He freely gave interviews to the Lebanese Press and openly attended *Hizballah* rallies.[68]

Fadlallah, although usefully identified in journalistic shorthand as the spiritual guide of *Hizballah*, refused to take the title upon himself. "I am not a guide of any particular Muslim group...", he insisted. "I do not endorse the attitude of any party if that attitude does not conform with my beliefs, which I boldly and frankly declare to the public."[69] By adopting this position, Fadlallah achieved two aims. He could not be held responsible for those *Hizballah* actions which he did not personally approve; and he could present himself as a compromise Muslim leader, rather than the head of one Shi'i faction.

As the Shi'i struggle against the Israeli occupation intensified during the winter of 1984-85, Iran also gained greater influence in Lebanon's Biqa' valley. The spiritual leader of *Hizballah* in this region, the Najaf-schooled Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli had none of Fadlallah's pretensions to independent leadership: "Our relationship with the Islamic revolution is one of a junior to a senior ...of a soldier to his commander".[70] The role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards *(Pasdaran)* contingent in the Biqa' was transformed by the conflict with Israel. They invested less effort in ideological indoctrination and more effort in training Lebanese Shi'is for guerilla warfare in the south. Their success in operating in an area under Syrian control lay in the determined efforts of Hujjat al-Islam 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemipur, Iranian Ambassador to Syria. Until late 1985, when he became Iran's Minister of Interior, Mohtashemipur was responsible for Iranian activity in Lebanon, and he periodically summoned Iran's leading Lebanese clients to his door in Damascus for instructions and exhortations.

Following Israel's withdrawal from all but a narrow strip of South Lebanon, Iran found an opportunity to proselytize openly in an area previously closed to it. This Iran sought to do by sending to Lebanon high-level emissaries who included the south in their itineraries. In May 1985, Hujjat al-Islam Mehdi Karrubi, head of the Martyrs' Foundation *(Bonyade Shahid)*, conducted a "congratulatory tour" of Lebanon, including areas recently evacuated by Israel.[71] He returned again in June 1985.[72] Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of the Islamic Propagation Organization *(Sazmane Tablighate Islami)* visited in July-August and again in October 1985.[73] Iran also promised large sums of reconstruction aid to Shi'i villages in the south and allocated stipends for the families of "martyrs" killed in the resistance against Israel. One hundred such families visited Iran in May 1985.[74] Iran thus hoped to put *Hizballah* at an advantage in challenging the influence of the rival Shi'i militia, *Amal*, in the south. These visits and promises were often made in a theatrical manner, and Nabih Barri,

Amal leader, ridiculed what he called the "knack for showmanship" of certain Iranians in Lebanon.[75] In turn, the leader of *Hizballah*'s Islamic *Amal*, Husayn al-Musawi, claimed that Barri came "late" to the struggle in the south, which was conducted by fighters loyal to Imam Khomeyni, even within *Amal*.[76] Barri, according to Musawi, had proven himself disloyal to Khomeyni by dealing with the Americans and not advocating continued struggle against Israel.[77]

During late 1984 and 1985, Iran also sought to build influence in the Tripoli region, where it had previously had none. This it achieved by winning the trust of Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban, head of a militia known as the Islamic Unification Movement *(Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami)*. This militia ran the predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli as an independent Islamic principality, under the rule of Islamic law. Sha'ban identified himself with no specific branch of Islam. He was born a Shi'i but had been schooled at al-Azhar, and he exemplified a kind of ecumenicism — or eclecticism — which made him responsive to Iran's overtures. For Iran, this liaison was a dangerous one: Sha'ban's movement steadfastly opposed Syria and Syrian-backed local forces over control of Tripoli. Iran's overture to Sha'ban was only possible due to a growing tepidness in the Syrian-Iranian relationship.

Syria so opposed Sha'ban's understanding with Iran that it prevented him from traveling to Iran via Syria in January 1985.[78] In July 1985, Sha'ban reportedly received an Iranian Revolutionary Guards delegation, and it was agreed that the Revolutionary Guards would supply his militia with arms and military instructors. That same month, Sha'ban reached an agreement for cooperation with *Hizballah*, which was mediated by Iran.[79] Iran thus expressed broad sympathy for Sha'ban when Syria mounted a virtual siege of Tripoli between August and October 1985 (see chapter on Lebanon). Iranian President 'Ali Khameneh'i played a major diplomatic role in the Tripoli battle, intervening forcefully with Syria on Sha'ban's behalf.[80] "Our brothers in Iran took prompt action to rescue Tripoli", declared Sha'ban.[81] Ayatollah Jannati included Tripoli in his Lebanon itinerary of October 1985,[82] and in December 1985 Sha'ban visited Iran, where Ayatollah Montazeri assured him that "Islamic rule [would] soon be established in Lebanon".[83] This obviously contradicted Syria's vision of Lebanon's future, and Syria's tolerance of Iranian-backed movements in Lebanon grew thin during 1985. (For more on the relationship, see chapters on Syria and Iran.)

Montazeri's plans for the quick establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon also chilled another relationship, that between Iran and Fadlallah. To Fadlallah's mind, Iran's haste made no allowance for the realities of Lebanon's heterogeneity and the inevitable opposition to an Islamic Lebanon by many powerful forces within and beyond the country. Stating this view openly,[84] Fadlallah earned an Iranian reprimand for allegedly demoralizing the ranks of *Hizballah*.[85] But Fadlallah stood his ground, insisting that the establishment of an Islamic republic in Lebanon would come only through a gradual and peaceful transformation. His stand against kidnappings,[86] and his jealousy of Shaykh Sha'ban's rise in Iranian esteem, also confirmed his independence and ambition. As a result, he was struck from Iran's guest list. Once a frequent visitor to the Islamic Republic, he now saw his juniors being accorded the Iranian honors once showered upon him alone. The Lebanese Shi'is who were favored as guests in Iran included Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli and Husayn al-Musawi, who together paid a highly publicized visit to Iran in August 1985,[87] and Ibrahim al-Amin, who visited in December 1985.[88] Nor could Fadlallah have been especially pleased by

the visit to Iran, in April-May 1985, of his principal rival for the spiritual leadership of Lebanon's Shi'i community, Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din. This cleric, head of Lebanon's Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council, had previously been at odds with Iran, which now sought to reconcile him in its effort to expand Iranian influence in Lebanon.

Lebanese Shi'is were also responsible for a series of kidnappings, hijackings, bombings and assassinations directed against Westerners and Western targets in the ME and Europe. Credit for many of these actions was claimed by the otherwise anonymous Islamic *Jihad*, usually in calls and letters to Beirut newspapers. Much speculation revolved around the nature of the group or groups involved, and around their possible connections with *Hizballah* and Iran.[89] Both *Hizballah* and Iran denied all connection with such deeds but regarded them as the inevitable product of a wholly justified rage against the foreign oppression of Muslims.[90] Ibrahim al-Amin stated, "...a principle...we do not support kidnapping or detaining any innocent. But in societies where the strong rules the weak, we should forgive the mistakes of the weak."[91] Fadlallah declared, "We do not justify the kidnapping of American citizens who might have nothing to do with their Government or might be opposed to it. When we explain this phenomenon [of kidnapping] it does not mean that we are in favor of it."[92] Declared Chargé d'Affaires Nurani, "We do not know anything about Islamic *Jihad*."[93] Karrubi, during one of his visits to Lebanon, said that Iran knew of the "existence or non-existence" of Islamic *Jihad* "through mass media".[94] There was a measure of disingenuousness in this simultaneous justifying of violence and protesting of ignorance regarding its perpetrators. This reached its height in the case of Islamic *Amal*'s Husayn al-Musawi. He was sufficiently well informed to opine that kidnapped Americans and Frenchmen definitely would not be released until the Kuwait prisoners were freed;[95] and, even while denying involvement, he still indicated that the kidnapping victims could well be in Ba'albak.[96] On the other hand, the October 1985 kidnapping of four Soviet diplomats in Beirut was not the work of *Hizballah*[97] and was opposed by Iran.[98] It involved a Sunni group in Tripoli, then under Syrian siege. Through the kidnapping, the group hoped to force the Soviets to intervene with the Syrians.

In June 1985, a group of Lebanese Shi'is hijacked a TWA airliner to Beirut, in what became the year's most spectacular confrontation between extremist Islam and the US. (For the unfolding of the hijacking and additional details, see chapter on armed operations.) Iran denied any foreknowledge of the hijacking. According to *Majlis* Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Iran would have prevented the hijacking, had it known who bore responsibility.[99] This seemed likely. But the hijackers did make the same demand as that made during previous acts of pro-Iranian violence: freedom for the Shi'is held in Kuwait. Only later was this demand dropped, to yield place of primacy to the demand for release of Shi'is detained by Israel. One report also linked one of the hijackers, 'Ali 'Atwa, directly to Iran and the Revolutionary Guards.[100] Here again, it was impossible to tell where half-truth ended and truth began. But whatever the extent of Iran's involvement (or the involvement of Iranians acting independently), Tehran quickly became distressed with the way the operation unfolded, on the ground in Beirut and in the media. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, on a visit to Damascus during the hijacking, withdrew all moral sanction from those hijackers linked to *Hizballah*, and they then rather reluctantly gave up the game by releasing their hostages.

In Lebanon, then, Iran still groped for a way to perpetuate the climate of struggle that so benefited Iran during Israel's occupation of the south. Iran continued to promote armed struggle against the residual Israeli presence in the area adjacent to Lebanon's border with Israel. But in pursuit of an Islamic republic of Lebanon, Iran wavered between violence and persuasion, and it faced the increasing opposition of Syria.

IRAN IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Iranian influence upon Afghanistan's Shi'i minority in the mountainous Hazarajat region became predominant by the end of 1984. The Central Government had been driven out of the region in 1979, and the area became the collective fief of a group of *sayyids* and landed notables. But in 1984, Iranian-backed Shi'i groups, capitalizing on rural discontent, succeeded in taking two thirds of the Hazarajat. Even remote villages came under the influence of young Iranian-trained mullahs and Afghan veterans of Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Recruits for Iran's missions of political and religious indoctrination were drawn from the reservoir of 1.5m Afghan refugees in Iran, some of whom also fought on the war front against Iraq. The Revolutionary Guards directly supervised the activities of one such Afghan resistance group, the *Sepahe Pasdaran*, which enjoyed a growing influence in the region thanks to heavy infusions of Iranian assistance. An older group, *Nasr*, also embraced Khomeyni's doctrine but had a more clearly Afghan vision of the country's future and refused to be integrated with the *Sepahe Pasdaran*. The only Shi'i group to pose a significant challenge to Iran's tightening grip was the *Harakate Islami* under Shaykh 'Arif Mohseni. Located on the fringe of the Hazarajat, this group reportedly bore the brunt of the Shi'i fighting against government forces.[101]

Iran carefully followed the activities of the Peshawar-based Afghan resistance groups, which were predominantly Sunni and enjoyed extensive Saudi and Muslim Brotherhood support (see above). When seven of these groups formed a coalition in May 1985, in the hope of eventually winning international recognition, Montazeri acted to create a counter-coalition of resistance groups backed by Iran. Five Iranian-supported groups answered his appeal for unity[102] and established a commission to study ways of overcoming their differences.[103] Iran apparently hoped to ensure that its own Afghan clients would not be ignored by any party prepared to extend recognition to the Afghan clients of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

In Pakistan, Iran had to proceed with far more caution in its dealings with the country's substantial Shi'i minority. Iran did seek to exercise an influence over these Shi'is, but it was very sensitive to the possible complications in a Pakistani society increasingly polarized between Sunnis and Shi'is. Iran had no desire to contribute to a worsening of the Shi'i position or to open itself to the charge of Shi'i partisanship. The Shi'i movement for minority rights had split in 1983, following the death of its founder, Mufti Ja'far Husayn. One group, under Mawlana Hamid 'Ali Shah, pursued a policy of moderation. He continued to negotiate with the Pakistani Government over the Shi'i demand that Sunni jurisprudence not be imposed on Shi'i Pakistanis as part of the country's Islamicization process. A more militant line was represented by 'Allama 'Arif Husayn al-Husayni. He favored a campaign based on street protests, with their ever-present danger of confrontation. Whether he also enjoyed the support of Iran was difficult to determine, although he himself supported Iran: he pressed a

March 1985 conference of Pakistan's foremost Shi'i organization to embrace the Imam Khomeyni's leadership and the war against Iraq.[104]

In July 1985, his followers defied a local ban on public processions in Quetta, and in a clash with police, thirty persons were killed. The authorities immediately ordered the detention of the 'Allama and other Shi'i *'ulama*. Iran responded with a measure of declaratory support, through the secretariat of the World Congress of Friday *Imams* and Prayer Leaders. A statement by this organization demanded the release of all detained *'ulama*, who, it charged, had been subjected to "psychological and physical torture".[105]

Iran did not go beyond such formal protestations, probably because Pakistan's Sunnis were repelled by the methods of the more militant Shi'is. To win Sunni sympathy, Iran arranged for its Lebanese client, the ostensibly Sunni Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban, to pay a visit to Pakistan on his way to Iran in December 1985. There he spoke of the need for Sunni-Shi'i unity, drawing upon the inspiration of Iran's revolution. Muslims "should rise above their fanaticism, narrow-mindedness, and sectarian squabbles", he said. "It is a pity that the Muslims are divided into so many factions and sects and each one calls the other *kafir*. Such groupings are forbidden in Islam and they can only give pleasure to our enemies. We should not think in terms of Sunnis and Shi'is."[106] The effect of such an appeal, in the highly charged sectarian climate of Pakistan, could not be measured.

IRAN AND SUNNI ISLAM

Elsewhere, Iran continued to pursue influence among Muslim movements opposed to conservative Arab regimes. In this campaign, Iran operated under a considerable handicap, due to Iran's weakened but persisting tie to a Syrian regime regarded by Sunni Fundamentalists as an enemy of Islam. Traditional Sunni prejudices also played some role. To overcome the aloofness of Sunni Fundamentalists, the Iranian media gave sympathetic coverage to their opposition activities against the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia. Less was known about actual cooperation between Iran and Sunni fundamentalist groups, which were reportedly promoted by Iranian embassies in London and Rome.

Some details came to light linking Tunisia's Islamic Tendency Movement (*Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami*) with Iran, through the Iranian ambassador to the Vatican, Ayatollah Hadi Khowsrowshahi.[107] The movement's spokesman later sought to minimize the importance of these ties, declaring, "We share Islam with a billion Muslims. We are not prepared to share Iran's concept of Islam".[108] It seemed probable that the movement maintained some link with Iran after 1981, when its leaders were imprisoned and some of its activists took refuge in Paris. But during 1985, the movement's leaders reached an understanding with the authorities which allowed their release. Thereafter, they sought to distance them from any charge of reliance upon foreign countries.[109]

With the exception of Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban's following in Lebanon (see above), no Sunni fundamentalist movement openly boasted of ties with Iran. A few individual Sunnis were drawn into Iran's orbit, and these were reportedly given exaggerated titles as ostensible heads of liberation movements based in Tehran.[110] But Lebanon remained the exception which proved the rule: despite all efforts, Iran had yet to hear its appeal echoed sympathetically — and obediently — in Sunni Islam.

THE CALL OF ISLAM FROM LIBYA

Libya also continued to disseminate a variety of Islam distilled from the religious predilections of Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. Libya's efforts in this campaign centered upon Black Africa and Southeast Asia, and Qadhdhafi personally bore the banner during his several visits to Black African capitals in 1985. (For the general context of Libya's policy in Africa, see chapter on Libya.)

In May 1985, Qadhdhafi visited Rwanda, in order to inaugurate an Islamic cultural center in the capital, Kigali. Libya's Islamic Call Society *(Jam'iyyat al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya)* had built the center in cooperation with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). (On the Islamic Call Society, see *MECS* 1981-82, pp 293-94; 1982-83, p 245.) During Friday prayers in Kigali, Qadhdhafi expounded at length on his personal vision of a thoroughly Muslim Africa: "Africa must be Muslim. Africa is not Christian. Christians are intruders in Africa. Christians in Africa are agents of Colonialism. We must wage a *jihad* so that Islam may spread in Africa". From Rwanda, Qadhdhafi expected Muslim missionaries to reach Uganda, Burundi, and particularly Zaire, a country under the "unjust rule" of President Mobutu Sese Seko, who had just completed a visit to Israel. "Killing him is the duty of every Muslim", declared Qadhdhafi. "You must incite Muslims in Zaire and urge them to engage in the *jihad* so that Mobutu may be toppled."[111] In December 1985, Qadhdhafi delivered a similar message to Ghanaian Muslims after prayers in Accra's central mosque. Libya had shouldered the responsibility for propagating Islam in Africa and throughout the world, in order to defeat "a new war waged by the Church against Muslims and Islam".[112] With this aim in mind, a joint Libyan-UAE corporation had built Islamic centers in Rwanda, Burundi, Togo, Senegal, and Mali, to teach Islam and Arabic.[113] These were all signs of Libya's growing *rapprochement* with certain Black African regimes, symbolized by the establishment of open centers for the propagation of Qadhdhafi's Islam.

In Malaysia, a Libyan-trained preacher led a fundamentalist uprising against government forces toward the end of 1985. The confrontation ended in eighteen deaths, including that of the group's leader.[114] Malaysia remained a favored setting for Libyan-financed activity, especially conferences, in which the authorities found no cause to interfere.[115] But beneath this overt work lay an unknown amount of covert activity in support of Muslim separatist movements in the Philippines and Thailand, using Malaysia as a base.

THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1985

The approach of the pilgrimage once again signaled the opening of another round in the confrontation between Saudi and Iranian claims to represent true Islam. (For the development of the pilgrimage controversy, see *MECS* 1981-82, pp 284-88, 301-3; 1982-83, pp 238, 249-51; 1983-84, pp 175-77.) Iran continued to insist upon the right of pilgrims to demonstrate against those who oppress Muslims, particularly Israel, the US, and the USSR.[116] According to Iran's past supervisor of the pilgrimage, Hujjat al-Islam Musavi-Kho'iniha, Iran had never claimed that political demonstrations were the essence of the pilgrimage ritual. What Iran did claim was that political demonstrations, under such slogans as "Death to Israel" and "Death to America", did not in any way negate the holiness of pilgrimage. The Saudis themselves, claimed Kho'iniha, politicized the pilgrimage: the Saudi King's annual address to pilgrims always touched on political themes, as did the sermons of Saudi preachers in the Great

Mosque.[117] Saudi Interior Minister, Prince Na'if Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, indeed affirmed that the pilgrimage had a political aspect: "We cannot separate Islam and its pillars from politics, because politics is [but] part and religion is a whole". According to him, the debate revolved around whether Islam should serve politics (presumably Iran's view) or politics should serve Islam (presumably Saudi Arabia's view).[118] But behind the often hair-splitting religious polemics between Iran and Saudi Arabia loomed a rather obvious rivalry between two regimes, each advancing an exclusive claim to primacy in Islam.

The visit of Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal to Iran in May 1985 provided an opportunity to discuss the pilgrimage issue in the broader context of Saudi-Iranian relations. Through this visit, each side sought to influence the stand taken by the other toward Iraq, and as a sign of mutual goodwill, both sides apparently agreed to show restraint during the coming pilgrimage. Saudi Arabia agreed to admit 150,000 Iranian pilgrims, the same figure as in the previous year, and to cooperate fully with Iranian officials in making practical arrangements. Iran agreed to limit the number of political demonstrations to two, one in Medina, the other in Mecca, and to discourage criticism of other Muslim governments by demonstrators. This understanding did not differ in any important respect from understandings reached, and generally honored, during the previous two pilgrimage seasons. But implementation would be the real test of the bargain, and this had less to do with the letter than with the spirit of the pledges made by both sides.[119]

Of possible significance in this regard was Khomeyni's decision to replace Kho'iniha with Karrubi. Kho'iniha had served as pilgrimage supervisor for three consecutive years, beginning with the most turbulent season ever, that of 1982. According to Khomeyni, Kho'iniha's new appointment as Prosecutor General "excused" him from supervising the pilgrimage.[120] Karrubi had some experience in dealing with Iran's Muslim clients in Lebanon, where he had visited, twice, earlier in 1985 (see above). Khomeyni denied the claim that Iran had somehow modified its pilgrimage policy by changing pilgrimage supervisors.[121] But because Karrubi had no personal record of confrontation with the Saudis, his appointment could be construed as a new beginning. Shortly before his appointment, he described Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia as good, saying, "They have been improving recently. We have common interests with them".[122]

The first test of the understanding came in late July 1985, when Iran received indications that Saudi Arabia wished to limit the number of Iranian pilgrims to 100,000, rather than the 150,000 supposedly promised by Sa'ud al-Faysal.[123] Iran immediately delivered an ultimatum: either 150,000 Iranians would attend the pilgrimage or none would.[124] Iranian President 'Ali Khameneh'i quickly sent a letter to this effect to Saudi King Fahd.[125] But on 28 July, two airplanes carrying Iranian pilgrims were turned away from Jidda airport before landing, leading Iran to cancel all other such flights.[126] Iran's Islamic Guidance Minister, Muhammad Khatami, asked "the entire world of Islam to act according to their historical and religious duty in the face of this open heresy and violation of the holy rights of Muslims".[127] The next day, however, Saudi Arabia relented and officially announced that it would accept 150,000 Iranian pilgrims.[128] Saudi Arabia had an obvious interest in reducing the Iranian pilgrimage, in line with the general reduction necessitated by unendurable crowding. A Saudi editorial commented, "It is impossible to give the opportunity for

hundreds of thousands of pilgrims from a certain country to be received here at the expense of Muslims who wish to perform the pilgrimage from another Islamic country."[129] But hosting 50,000 more Iranians was apparently deemed preferable to facing a disagreeable Iran, and the Saudis relented.

Now Iran fulfilled its part of the deal. Karrubi admonished departing Iranian pilgrims to "avoid clashes and arguments with the Saudi officials and forces".[130] Once in Medina, his first stop, Karrubi urged Iran's pilgrims to "demonstrate behavior worthy of Muslims", to pray behind Sunni prayer leaders in the mosques of Medina and Mecca, and to "avoid individual slogans which would cause unnecessary clashes with Saudi officials".[131] The authorized demonstration held by Iran's pilgrims in Medina on 9 August passed without incident.[132]

The critical moment came in Mecca on 22 August, the date set for the authorized demonstration by Iranian pilgrims in Islam's holiest city. At the very start of this demonstration, a lengthy message from Khomeyni was read to the demonstrators, whom Iran numbered at 150,000 Iranians and "tens of thousands" from other countries. The statement constituted a general indictment of the US and the USSR. Israel and Lebanon found no mention, but Khomeyni did take the opportunity to predict the demise of the "blasphemous and criminal Iraqi regime" and "that wretch Saddam Husayn". Khomeyni then emphasized that while "the shouts of revolution against the infidels and tyrants should be raised in a crushing fashion", the demonstrating pilgrims should "refrain from unauthorized slogans". They should "only take part in the marches which [had] been planned and should not organize other marches on their own initiative". Khomeyni threatened those who violated these instructions with "the anger of the Prophet of God" and "punishment by God Almighty".[133] This unusually stiff admonition had the desired effect. The demonstration, under the watchful eyes of Saudi police, passed without incident.[134]

A pilgrimage accord had been reached, the by-product of a mild improvement in Iranian-Saudi relations in 1985. After the pilgrimage, Karrubi's success in managing the demonstrations without incident won him a permanent appointment as Khomeyni's pilgrimage representative and supervisor of Iran's pilgrims in future years.[135] Iran could also take pride in the fact that its pilgrims represented 18 per cent of all foreign pilgrims during the 1985 season, the largest foreign group and the largest proportion of Iranians ever.[136]

Yet after the pilgrimage, Ayatollah Montazeri resorted to a polemical theme in an attack on Saudi Arabia which Khomeyni himself had scrupulously avoided: the charge that the Saudis, as heirs of the Wahhabis, were not even Sunnis but deviants from Islam. During Iran's "Unity Week", falling between the Prophet's birthday as marked by Sunnis and Shi'is, Montazeri declared that Wahhabism

> was originally founded by mercenaries affiliated to foreigners, and its chief objective was to create factionalism and division between the world's Muslims, whether Sunnis or Shi'is. ... This sect did not have any faith in Islam or the Qur'an, and Shi'is and Sunnis loathe this sect and the things that they do. The aim of this sect is to eliminate the history of Islam.[137]

This hoary style of anti-Wahhabism, although implicit in Islamic Iran's pilgrimage polemic, had never been voiced by any important Iranian leader in so unvarnished a

fashion. It did not bode well for Saudi-Iranian relations or the perpetuation of the pilgrimage peace.

Martin Kramer

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources". Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

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39. *Al-Nur*, 20 March, 1 May; *al-Ahram*, 1 May 1985.
40. *Al-Liwa al-Islami*, 4 July 1985.
41. *Al-Ahram*, 23 April 1985.
42. Text of address, R. Baghdad VoM, 24 April — SWB, 27 April 1985.
43. Text of resolutions, Baghdad TV, in Persian, 28 April — DR, 30 April 1985.
44. Names of committee members, INA, 25 April — SWB, 29 April 1985.
45. R. Tehran, 3 May — SWB, 6 May 1985.
46. For another view, arguing moderation in this policy, see R. K. Ramazani, "Iran: Burying the Hatchet", *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1985, pp 52-74.
47. Rafsanjani speech, R. Tehran, 31 October — SWB, 2 November 1984.
48. Montazeri speech, IRNA, 5 January — SWB, 8 January 1985.
49. R. Tehran, 18 October — SWB, 22 October 1985.
50. Conference resolutions summarized, R. Tehran, 31 January — SWB, 2 February 1985.
51. *The Observer*, 7 April; *The Economist*, 18 May; R. Tehran, 2 August — DR, 2 August; IRNA, 4 August — DR, 7 August; *Ettela'at*, 5 August 1985.
52. Beirut conference, *al-Muntalaq*, October; Bangkok conference, *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 4 August 1985.
53. *The Guardian*, 9 March (citing subscription newsletter *al-Taqrir*); *al-Qabas*, 7 November 1985, which includes an organizational table and appears to have inspired the report in *FR*, 27 February 1986.
54. Details on those killed, statements by Baqir al-Hakim, Khomeyni, and others, *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 17 March 1985.
55. Statement by hijackers, R. Tehran, in Arabic, 7 December — SWB, 10 December 1984.
56. Identity of bomber and his affiliation discussed in *al-Nashra*, 3 June 1985. Although credit was initially claimed by Islamic *Jihad*, another statement issued by Islamic *Jihad* denied responsibility; *TT*, 4 June 1985.
57. IRNA, 25 May — SWB, 28 May; Iranian discussion of Iraq's alleged responsibility, *TT*, 9 June 1985.
58. Details of expulsion policy, *Gulf Daily News*, 30 July 1985.
59. *Al-Dustur*, London, 1 July; report of Front members "under the deepest cover" in Great Britain, *The Observer*, 7 April; details on Front's history, *al-Nashra*, 22 July; recent elaboration of the Front's aims by its spokesman, *al-Thawra al-Risaliyya*, August 1985.
60. *Al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, July 1985.
61. Fadlallah interview, *al-Shira'*, Beirut, 18 March 1985.
62. Martin Kramer, "Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah", *Orient*, June 1985, pp 147-49.
63. Interview with Hamud and Kanj, *al-Shira'*, Beirut, 19 December 1983.
64. *Monday Morning*, 14 January 1985.
65. Account of rally, *al-Safir*, 17 February 1985.
66. On Ibrahim al-Amin, see his interview with *al-Shira'*, 13 August 1984.
67. Ibrahim al-Amin interview, *Newsweek*, 8 July 1985.
68. See account of Beirut rally marking anniversary of Iran's revolution, *al-Nahar*, 11 January 1985.
69. Fadlallah interview, *al-Nahar al-'Arabi wal-Duwali*, 1 July 1985.
70. Tufayli interview, *Ettela'at*, 20 August 1985. The same profession of absolute allegiance to Iran was made by another *Hizballah* leader in the Biqa', 'Abbas al-Musawi; see interview, AFP, 10 July — DR, 11 July 1985.
71. IRNA, 4 May — SWB, 6 May 1985.

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72. *TT*, 8 June 1985.
73. IRNA, 17 October — DR, 18 October; R. Tehran, 19 October — SWB, 22 October 1985. Jannati was guest of honor at a special "pilgrimage and Muslim unity" conference held in Beirut in July; *al-Muntalaq*, October 1985.
74. R. Tehran, 5 May — 7 May 1985.
75. Radio Free Lebanon, 7 June — SWB, 13 June 1985.
76. Musawi interview, *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 25 August 1985.
77. Musawi interview, *al-Nahar al-'Arabi wal-Duwali*, 28 October 1985.
78. VoL, 31 January — SWB, 2 February; *al-'Amal*, Beirut, 1 February 1985.
79. Details on Sha'ban's relations with Iran, *al-Siyasa*, 17 October 1985.
80. Account of Khameneh'i's role, *al-Majalla*, 22 September 1985.
81. IRNA, 4 October — DR, 7 October 1985.
82. Jannati interview on Tripoli visit, R. Tehran, 20 October — DR, 21 October 1985.
83. R. Tehran, 15 December — SWB, 17 December 1985.
84. In numerous interviews, e.g., *al-Usbu' al-'Arabi*, 25 November 1985.
85. Reports of Fadlallah's fall from favor, *Early Warning*, July; *Kayhan*, London, 29 August — JPRS, 11 October 1985. Both reports speak of a shift of Iran's attentions to Subhi al-Tufayli.
86. In numerous interviews, e.g., *al-Nahar al-'Arabi wal-Duwali*, 1 July 1985.
87. Delegation meeting with Montazeri, R. Tehran, 23 August — SWB, 26 August; *Ettela'at*, 24 August; delegation news conference, IRNA, R. Tehran, 22 August — DR, 22 August; extensive coverage in *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 25 August 1985. One report spoke of this visit as an attempt to mend some breach between Tufayli and Musawi; VoL, 19 August — DR, 19 August 1985.
88. R. Tehran, 6 December — SWB, 9 December 1985. Ibrahim al-Amin led what purported to be a joint *Hizballah-Amal* delegation.
89. See, e.g., *Middle East Strategic Report*, 5 October 1984.
90. See interview on "religious terrorism" with Fadlallah and Hamud, *al-Usbu' al-'Arabi*, 12 August 1985.
91. Ibrahim al-Amin interview, *Newsweek*, 8 July 1985.
92. Fadlallah interview, *al-Nahar al-'Arabi wal-Duwali*, 1 July 1985.
93. Nurani interview, *Monday Morning*, 14 January 1985.
94. *TT*, 6 June; *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 9 June 1985.
95. *Al-Nahar*, 1 November 1985.
96. Musawi interview, *al-Nahar al-'Arabi wal-Duwali*, 28 October 1985.
97. Condemnations by Musawi, *al-Nahar al-'Arabi wal-Duwali*, 28 October; by Tufayli, *al-Safir*, 24 October 1985.
98. Nurani statement, AFP, 27 October — DR, 28 October 1985.
99. SANA, 26 June — SWB, 26 June 1985.
100. According to this report, 'Ali 'Atwa had visited Iran in May 1985, in the framework of the visit by one hundred families of Lebanese Shi'i "martyrs" (see above). There he underwent training in two camps, and then reached Ba'albak via Damascus for further training. He reportedly answered to a Revolutionary Guard commander named as the mastermind of the hijacking, allegedly planned in Ba'albak during early June 1985. See *al-Qabas*, 11 November; cf *al-Siyasa*, 17 October 1985.
101. Report on Iran's influence over Shi'i resistance, *Le Monde*, 17 October 1984; cf *The Guardian*, 31 January 1985.
102. Details of appeal, R. Tehran, 21 May — DR, 22 May; Meshhed in Dari, 4 June — SWB, 6 June 1985 (these are Dari-language broadcasts directed into Afghanistan from a transmitter in Meshhed).
103. IRNA, 23 May — SWB, 25 May; R. Tehran, 28 July — DR, 31 July; *Kayhan*, 29 July 1985.
104. Account of conference, *TT*, 26 March 1986.
105. R. Tehran, 11 September — DR, 12 September 1985.
106. Sha'ban interview in Pakistan, *Crescent International*, 16 January 1986 (originally published in *The Muslim*).
107. *Al-Dustur*, London, 15 July 1985.

108. 'Abd al-Fattah Muru interview, *Jeune Afrique*, 7 August 1985.
109. On this movement's fortunes, see *al-Majalla*, 10 July; *NYT*, 18 November 1985.
110. *Al-Qabas*, 7 November 1985, which also names these individuals.
111. Tripoli VoGAH, 17 May — DR, 20 May 1985.
112. JANA, 9 December — SWB, 10 December 1985.
113. JANA, 6 December — DR, 9 December 1985.
114. *Newsweek*, 9 December 1985.
115. E.g., an Islamic culture conference, described in *Risalat al-Jihad*, September 1985.
116. See compendium of Khomeyni's statements on pilgrimage, and other ideological material, in *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 11 August 1985.
117. Kho'iniha interview, *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, September 1985.
118. R. Riyadh, 18 August — DR, 20 August 1985.
119. Before the pilgrimage, both Iraq and Iranian opposition groups sought to convince the Saudis of Iranian bad faith. They charged that Iran planned to infiltrate Revolutionary Guards into the pilgrimage and wreak havoc. For photographs of what purport to be Iranian documents to this effect, see *al-Dustur*, London, 15 July; source of documents indicated as Shahpur Bakhtiyar, R. Iran, 27 July — DR, 30 July 1985. It was impossible to determine the authenticity of such documents.
120. Khomeyni's edict of appointment, R. Tehran, 19 July — DR, 22 July; *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 28 July 1985.
121. Khomeyni speech, R. Tehran, 16 July — DR, 17 July 1985.
122. *TT*, 6 June 1985.
123. First indications of cutback, R. Tehran, 22 July — DR, 23 July; Islamic Guidance Minister Muhammad Khatami interview, R. Tehran, 25 July — DR, 25 July 1985.
124. R. Tehran, 24 July — DR, 25 July 1985.
125. R. Tehran, 25, 26 July — DR, 26 July 1985.
126. R. Tehran, 29 July — DR, 29 July 1985.
127. Khatami statement, R. Tehran, 29 July — DR, 29 July 1985.
128. AFP, 29 July — DR, 29 July; R. Tehran, 29 July — DR, 29 July; R. Riyadh, 29 July — DR, 29 July 1985.
129. *'Ukaz*, 26 July 1985.
130. R. Tehran, 30 July — SWB, 1 August 1985.
131. R. Tehran, 8 August — DR, 8 August 1985.
132. Demonstration described, R. Tehran, 10, 11 August — DR, 12 August 1985.
133. Text of Khomeyni message, *KI*, 25 August; R. Tehran, 22 August — DR, 23 August 1985.
134. IRNA, 22 August — DR, 23 August 1985.
135. IRNA, 29 September — DR, 30 September; R. Tehran, 29 September — SWB, 1 October 1985.
136. Official figures, SPA, 23 August — SWB, 30 August 1985.
137. R. Tehran, 1 December — SWB, 3 December 1985.